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18 Efficient Auctions With Common Values
Andrei Laurentiu Ciupan
Abstract. Consider the problem of allocating goods to buyers through an
auction. An auction is efficient if the resulting allocation maximizes total
welfare, conditional on the information available. If buyers have private values,
the Vickrey-Groves-Clarke mechanism is efficient. If buyers have common
values and a buyer’s information can be summarized as a one-dimensional
signal, Dasgupta and Maskin present an efficient auction. We construct an
efficient auction mechanism in case buyer information is multidimensional, for
a restricted class of valuation functions, and we prove which of the assumptions
made are necessary for the existence of an efficient mechanism.
1. Introduction
Assume there is a set N = {1, 2, . . . n} of n buyers, and a set M = {1, 2, . . .m}
of m goods. Each buyer i observesm one-dimensional signals si1, si2, . . . sim, where
sik is buyer i’s signal corresponding to good k. For every i ∈ N, k ∈M , let Sik ⊆ R
denote the space of all possible signals that buyer i can observe for good k. Further,
for every k ∈ M , let Sk = ×i∈NSik. Let Ti = ×k∈MSik denote the space of all
signals that buyer i can observe for all goods. For any buyer i ∈ N and any good
k ∈ M , let Ti,k be the space of signals relevant to buyer i ’s valuation of good k,
and let Ti = ×k∈MTi,k the set of all signals relevant to buyer i’s valuation of all
goods. Finally, let vi,k : Ti,k 7→ R be buyer i’s valuation function of good k.
We may consider valuations of more than one good from the set M . For a
buyer i and a subset of goods S ⊆ M , let Ti,S = ×k∈STi,k be the space of signals
relevant to buyer i’s valuation of the set S, and let vi,S : Ti,S 7→ R be buyer i’s
valuation function for the goods in the set S. The valuation of an empty set vi,∅ is
null for every buyer i ∈ N .
If buyers have private values, then Ti,k = Sik, for all i ∈ N and k ∈M .
If a buyer’s valuation of a given good depends on the other buyers’ signals, i.e.
if buyers have common values, then Ti,k = Sk, for all i ∈ N and k ∈M .
Let us illustrate common and private values with two examples.
Example 1. Consider two investors competing for an apartment complex. Each
investor i observes the current value of the apartment complex, denoted si, has a
projected return on investment ri and a faces a fixed cost ci. Therefore, buyer i’s
valuation of the auctioned good is
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(1.1) vi(si) = (1 + ri) · si − ci
Since investor i’s valuation is independent of any other investor’s, this is a case
of private values.
Example 2. Consider two amateur collectors competing for two Van Gogh
paintings, labeled A and B. Each collector is only interested in buying only one of
the two paintings and has ordered a private evaluation of each painting, with buyer
i obtaining an estimated valuation of siA for good A and siB for good B. However,
each collector considers that his or her valuation is likely incomplete, and considers
the other collector’s estimations when deciding how much each painting is worth,
taking a linear combination of the 2 private estimated evaluations. The collector
valuations can be expressed as
(1.2) v1A(s1A, s2A) = s1A +
1
2
s2A, v1B(s1B , s2B) = s1B +
1
2
s2B
(1.3) v2A(s1A, s2A) = s2A +
1
3
s1A, v2B(s1B , s2B) = s2B +
1
3
s1B
This is an example of common values, since a buyer’s valuation is affected by
the other buyer’s signal.
Note that it seems reasonable to assume that the full information determining
a buyer’s valuation for a set of goods is not a one-dimensional value but a multidi-
mensional vector, with one signal component for each good. Consider the example
above: if the goods are different, then the full valuation information is a function
of s1A for good A and s1B for good B, and these two signals need not be related.
Even though the multidimensional signals assumption is more general than a
one-dimensional signal assumption, the authors in [6] show that we cannot have,
in general, an efficient auction with multidimensional signals. We deal with the
necessary assumptions in section 3.
Throughout this paper we assume that signal values are private information,
i.e. each buyer only knows his or her signal values and has no information on the
other buyers’ signal values. The auction designer also has no knowledge about
buyers’ signal values.
An allocation is a partition M = ⊔i∈NSi, such that for all i ∈ N , buyer i
receives the goods in the set Si. The welfare of an allocation M = ⊔i∈NSi is
defined as the total sum of valuations, given the buyers’ signals:
(1.4) W (S1, S2, . . . Sn) =
∑
i∈N
vi,Si(ti,Si),
where ti,Si is the relevant set of signals for buyer i’s valuation of the goods in the
set Si, as derived from the overall set of signals {sik|i ∈ N, k ∈M}.
Recall that for each buyer i ∈ N , Ti = ×k∈MSik is the space of all signals that
buyer i can observe for all goods. For a given set of signals ti ∈ Ti, let σi(ti) define
buyer i’s strategy in this case, and let Σi denote the set of all possible strategies
that buyer i could have. Note that a strategy σi ∈ Σi need not be a real-valued
function. It is simply a defined set of actions that buyer i will undertake for any
given set of signals ti ∈ Ti.
The auction designer interacts with buyers according to their strategies σj(tj)
for all buyers j ∈ N and decides how to allocate the goods being auctioned and
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how much to charge each buyer. If as a result of an auction buyer i receives a set
S of goods with valuation vi(S) and is required to make a payment Pi(S), his or
her utility is simply the valuation of the goods received minus the payment,
(1.5) Ui(S, Pi(S)) = vi(S)− Pi(S)
For a given set of buyer signals t1, t2, . . . , tn and a given set of buyer strategies
σ1, σ2, . . . , σn, let
(1.6) Ui(σ1, σ2, . . . , σn, t1, t2, . . . , tn)
denote buyer i’s expected utility as a result of the auction allocation and pay-
ment rules, following (1.5).
We say that an n-tuple of strategies σ∗ = (σ∗1 , σ
∗
2 , . . . , σ
∗
n) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 · · · × Σn
constitutes a Nash Equilibrium if for all buyers i ∈ N and for all (t1, t2, . . . tn) ∈
T1 × T2 · · · × Tn, we have
(1.7)
Ui(σ
∗, t1, t2, . . . , tn) ≥ Ui(σ
∗
1 , σ
∗
2 , . . . , σ
∗
i−1, σi, σ
∗
i+1, . . . , σ
∗
n, t1, t2, . . . , tn), for all σi ∈ Σi
This means that given the other buyers’ strategies σ∗−i, the strategy σ
∗
i is the
one with the highest utility for buyer i for all possible signal values (t1, t2, . . . tn)
that the buyers could have. In this paper we only deal with pure strategies, i.e.
buyer strategies which are not randomized.
An auction is efficient if there is a Nash Equilibrium of the buyers’ bidding
strategies which leads to the welfare-maximizing allocation. We continue by de-
scribing efficient auction mechanisms for private and common values.
We first deal with the case of private values, then overview the Dasgupta-
Maskin [6] results and move forward to the case of multidimensional signals and
common values. Finally, in case valuation functions are linear and each buyer
gains no additional benefit from having more than one good, we present an efficient
auction mechanism.
2. Private Values
In the case of private values, as in Example 1, the Vickrey- Clarke-Groves
mechanism is efficient. We describe the mechanism and prove that it is indeed
efficient.
Assume we have a set of N buyers and M goods to be auctioned. The
mechamism is as follows:
(1) Bidding. Each buyer i ∈ N selects a subset Xi ⊆ 2
M and submits bids
bi(S) for each S ∈ Xi. For all subsets of S
′ ⊆ M for which buyer i did
not submit a bid, it is considered that bi(S
′) = 0.
(2) Allocation. Given buyers’ bids, consider the allocation S = (S1, S2, . . . , Sn)
which maximizes welfare as defined in (1.4), under the hypothesis that the
bids which the buyers submit represent their actual valuations for each
set of goods. If there are more such allocations, uniformly select one of
them at random. Each buyer i receives the goods in the set Si.
(3) Payment. Let S′−i = (S1(i), S2(i), . . . , Sn(i)) be the welfare-maximizing
allocation of theM goods to the buyersN−{i}, under the same hypothesis
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from step (2) above, and let W (S′−i) =
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
bj(Sj(i)) be the apparent
welfare from this allocation. Note that Si(i) = ∅. If S = (S1, S2, . . . , Sn)
is the selected allocation from step (2), with apparent welfare W (S) =∑
j∈N
bj(Sj), then buyer i pays Pi(S) =W (S
′
−i)−W (S) + bi(Si).
As in all the auction mechanisms that we present in the paper, we first prove that
the allocation and payment mechanisms are well-defined, then prove that truthful
bidding is a Nash Equilibrium. Let’s first prove that the payment mechanism is
well-defined.
Lemma 2.1. For any buyer i ∈ N , the payment Pi(S) is nonnegative and does
not depent on the bid that he or she makes. It only depends on the selected allocation
in step (2) .
Proof. For any buyer j ∈ N and any set S ⊆ M , let vj(S) denote buyer j’s
valuation of the set of goods in S. Let Si and S
′
−i be the allocations selected at
steps (2) and (3) from the mechanism above. Note that Pi(S) =W (S
′
−i)−W (S)+
bi(Si) =
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
(bj(Sj(i))− bj(Sj)), so indeed the payment does not depend on
bi(Si). Furthermore, since S
′
−i is the welfare-maximizing allocation of the goods
in M to the buyers in N − {i}, we must have
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
bj(Sj(i)) ≥
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
bj(Sj), so
indeed the payment is nonnegative, as desired .
We will prove that this auction is efficient.
Theorem 2.2. [1, 2, 3]Truthful bidding, i.e. bidding one’s true valuation of
every subset of the goods in M , represents a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. Fix a buyer i ∈ N , and assume that all other buyers bid truthfully, i.e
bj(S) = vj(S) for all buyers j 6= i and all subsets S ⊆M . Let S = (S1, S2, . . . Sn) be
the allocation of the goods according to the auction above if all buyers bid truthfully,
with Si be the set of goods that buyer i obtains (with the observation that Si can be
empty). In this case, buyer i makes a payment of Pi(S) =W (S
′
−i)−W (S)+bi(Si),
where S′−i = (S1(i), S2(i), . . . , Sn(i)) is the welfare-maximizing allocation of the M
goods to the buyers N − {i}.
Note that buyer i’s utility from truthful bidding is vi(Si) − Pi(S) = vi(Si) +
W (S)−W (S′−i)− vi(Si), which can be rewritten as
(2.1) W (S)−W (S′−i)
Since S is the welfare-maximizing allocation, buyer i’s utility is nonnegative in this
case, and therefore he or she has no incentive to bid so that he or she doesn’t receive
any goods.
Now assume that buyer i bids so that the welfare-maximizing allocation of the
goods in M to the buyers in N , as calculated in step (2) of the auction above, is
S′ = (S′1, S
′
2, . . . , S
′
n). Note that since all other buyers except for i bid truthfully,
so S′−i, the welfare-maximizing allocation of the goods in M to buyers in N − {i},
is unchanged. Buyer i pays Pi(S
′) = W (S′−i) −W (S
′) + bi(S
′
i), and his utility in
this case is
(2.2) vi(S
′
i)−W (S
′
−i) +
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
vj(S
′
j)
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Let us compare this to the utility obtained from truthful bidding, W (S)−W (S′−i).
Since S is the welfare-maximizing allocation under truthful bidding, we must have
W (S) ≥ vi(S
′
i) +
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
vj(S
′
j), which indeed implies that the utility obtained
from truthful bidding is greater than or equal to the utility obtained from any
other bidding. Thus truthful bidding represents a Nash Equilibrium .
Note that a very similar approach allows us to prove that truthful bidding is
in fact weakly dominant, i.e. regardless of the other buyers’ strategies, truthful
bidding is always a best response for a given buyer.
We will see that there is a common characteristic and intuition behind all effi-
cient auctions: have buyers submit their signals, valuations, or equivalent messages
which would allow valuations to be calculated, allocate goods according to the ap-
parent welfare-maximizing allocation, and select a payment which induces truthful
bidding in Nash Equilibrium.
It is the payment mechanism that is the most important in efficient auctions.
The idea behind the Vickrey-Groves-Clarke payment mechanism is that each buyer
i has to pay the marginal effect of his or her presence in the auction to the other
buyers: if buyer i were not present in the auction, the buyers’ welfare is equal to
W−i. With buyer i present in the auction, denote total welfare W , and let vi(Si)
be buyer i’s utility. Therefore, with buyer i present in the auction, the total welfare
that the N −{i} buyers receive decreases to W − vi(Si), and the marginal effect of
buyer i’s presence in the auction is W−i −W + vi(Si).
This is the payment that we want to induce to buyer i. Note that this payment
allows buyer i’s utility (valuation minus payment) to be a function of total welfare,
as seen in relations (2.1) and (2.2). Therefore the payment mechanism forces each
buyer’s attempt to maximize his or her own utility to be equivalent to maximizing
overall welfare, leading the mechanism to be efficient, as proved above. We will see
variations of these ideas throughout the next auction designs.
Let us now deal with the case of common values.
3. Common values and one-dimensional signals
In [6], Dasgupta and Maskin deal with the case of common values and one-
dimensional signals for the general case of any number of buyers and any number
of goods. In this section we present the case of n ≥ 2 buyers and one good. Assume
that buyer i receives signal si, and that his or her valuation is a function of all
other buyers’ signals, vi(s1, s2, . . . sn). For simplicity let Si = R, i.e. assume that
the set of all possible signals for each buyer is the real line. The authors make the
following two assumptions on valuation functions: each buyer i’s valuation must be
increasing in si, and the marginal effect of signal si on buyer i’s valuation is larger
than the marginal effect of signal si on any other buyer’s valuation. These can be
expressed as
(3.1)
∂vi
∂si
(s1, s2, . . . , sn) > 0, for all (s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈ R
n, and
(3.2) For all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, we have
∂vi
∂si
(s1, s2, . . . , sn) >
∂vj
∂si
(s1, s2, . . . , sn)
at any point where vi(s1, s2, . . . , sn) = vj(s1, s2, . . . , sn) = max
k∈N
vk(s1, s2, . . . sn)
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Further, assume that valuation functions are common knowledge among the
buyers, i.e. buyer i knows buyer j’s valuation function for any i, j ∈ N . The
auction designer need not know the functional forms. We are looking for an auction
design which would determine truthful bidding and allow buyer valuations to be
calculated. The following mechanism is proposed for two buyers:
(1) Bidding. Each buyer i submits a bid function bi : R 7→ R, such that
(3.3) |b′i(x)| < 1 for all x ∈ R.
(2) Allocation. Given the bid functions above, select the fixed point (v◦1 , v
◦
2)
such that
(3.4) (v◦1 , v
◦
2) = (b1(v
◦
2), b2(v
◦
1))
If there is no fixed point, the auction terminates and the good is not
allocated. Condition (3.3) assures that there is at most one fixed point,
since relation (4.4) can be rewritten as b1(b2(v
◦
1)) = v
◦
1 , and the function
b1 ◦ b2 also satisfies condition (3.3), implying that it must have at most
one fixed point. If v◦1 > v
◦
2 , then buyer 1 receives the good. If v
◦
1 < v
◦
2 ,
buyer 2 receives the good. If v◦1 = v
◦
2 , the good is offered uniformly at
random to one of the buyers.
(3) Payment. If buyer i receives the good, he or she makes a payment v∗1 ,
where v∗1 is a point for which v
∗
1 = b2(v
∗
1)
Assume that buyer 1 observes signal s1 and buyer 2 observes signal s2. In this
auction, function b1 of buyer 1 represents a truthful bid if and only if
(3.5) b1(v2(s1, s2)) = v1(s1, s2) for all s2 ∈ R,
with the simmetric definition for buyer 2. Note that condition (3.1) assures that
relation (3.5) is well-defined. Note that as a result of truthful bidding, the equilib-
rium point in (v◦1 , v
◦
2) is precisely (v1(s1, s2), v2(s1, s2)). The authors in [6] prove
that truthful bidding is a Nash Equilibrium of this auction, and that as a result
of truthful bidding, the good is allocated to the buyer with the highest valuation
vi(s1, s2).
The case of n ≥ 3 buyers, the auction mechanism is in the same vein as above,
but there is more care regarding multiple potential fixed points. Buyers are again
required to submit bid functions contingent on the other buyers’ valuations, but
since the valuations don’t necessarily uniquely identify one valuation, as in equation
(3.5) above, buyers are required to submit bid correspondences, representing the set
of valuations they could potentially have if the other buyers have given valuations.
The auction design is as follows:
(1) Bidding. Each buyer i ∈ N submits a bid correspondence bi : R
n−1 −→ R
(2) Allocation. A fixed point v◦ = (v◦1 , v
◦
2 , . . . , v
◦
n) is chosen so that
(3.6) v◦i ∈ bi(v
◦
−i), for all i ∈ N
If there is no such fixed point, the good is not awarded and no buyer
makes a payment. If there are multiple such n-dimensional fixed points
v◦1 = (v◦11 , v
◦1
2 , . . . , v
◦1
n ), v
◦2 = (v◦21 , v
◦2
2 , . . . , v
◦2
n ), . . . , v
◦k = (v◦k1 , v
◦k
2 , . . . , v
◦k
n ),
then the bid functions are made public, and each buyer i chooses one of
the k values v◦1i , v
◦2
i , . . . , v
◦k
i . If the buyers do not agree on the same fixed
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point, the good is not awarded and no buyer makes a payment. If all
buyers agree on the same fixed point v◦ = (v◦1 , v
◦
2 , . . . , v
◦
n), the buyer sat-
isfying i = argmax
j∈N
v◦j receives the good. If there is a tie, the good is
allocated uniformly at random among the buyers with the highest v◦i .
(3) Payment Let v◦ = (v◦1 , v
◦
2 , . . . , v
◦
n) be the fixed point selected at step 2
above. If the good was not allocated to buyer i, he or she makes no
payment. If the good was allocated to buyer i, he or she makes a payment
of
(3.7) max
j 6=i,j∈N
v∗j ,
where v∗ = (v∗1 , v
∗
2 , . . . v
∗
n) is a vector such that
(3.8) v∗k ∈ bk(v
∗
−k) for all k 6= i, k ∈ N
and
(3.9) v∗i = max
j∈N,j 6=i
v∗j
If no such vector v∗ exists, the good is not awarded and no buyer
makes a payment. If there are multiple such vectors, the bids are made
public and each buyer selects one of the possible vectors satisfying (3.8)
and (3.9) above. If they all agree on the same vector, buyer i makes a
payment according to (3.7). If the buyers do not all agree, the good is not
awarded and no buyer makes a payment.
The authors prove that truthful bidding constitutes a Nash Equilibrium, and
hence the auction is efficient. Truthful bidding of buyer i with signal si is character-
ized by bidding bi(v−i) = {vi ∈ R| there exist signals s
′
−i ∈ R
n−1 such that vi(si, s
′
−i) =
vi and vj(si, s
′
−i) = vj for all j ∈ N, j 6= i}. Moreover, since there might be a
chance of multiple fixed points in either step (2) or step (3) in the auction above,
those strategies need to be defined as well. Here is how the authors deal with the
multiple points of step (2) :
If there is a unique vector s′−i such that, for all buyers j 6= i and all v−j ∈ R
n−1,
the bid functions (which are made public in case there are multiple fixed points in
step 2) satisfy the property that bj(v−j) represents a truthful bid of buyer j as if
his signal were s′j , then buyer i chooses the value satisfying v
◦
i = vi(si, s
′
−i). If
there are no such vectors s′−i or multiple such vectors, then buyer i chooses one of
the fixed points described in step (2) uniformly at random.
Similarly, truthful bidding in case of multiple fixed points at step 3 is defined
as follows:
If there is a unique vector s′−i such that, for all buyers j 6= i and all v−j ∈ R
n−1,
the bid functions satisfy the property that bj(v−j) represents a truthful bid of buyer
j as if his or her signal were s′j , and additionally vi(si, s
′
−i) = max
j∈N,j 6=i
vj(si, s
′
−i),
then the buyer selects the fixed point v∗i = vi(si, s
′−i). If there no such vectors s′−i
or multiple such vectors, then buyer i randomizes uniformly between the available
fixed points.
In case there is only one auctioned good, the Dasgupta-Maskin mechanisms are
efficient. In case there is more than one good to be auctioned, the set of signals
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relevant for a group of two or more goods will not be one-dimensional anymore.
However, under the assumption that there exist real numbers t1, t2, . . . tn such that
for any buyer i and any set S of goods, buyer i’s valuation of S can be expressed
as a function of t1, t2, . . . tn,the authors extend the one-good mechanism above to
any set of goods.
In the next sections we deal with the case where valuation functions cannot
be summarized by a one-dimensional vector for every buyer. In the case where no
buyer receives any marginal utility from having more than one good from the set
we present an efficient auction mechanism. We can imagine example (2) in the in-
troduction as a suitable case, or consider spectrum auctions, where the government
auctions airwave frequency intervals to companies and no company is interested in
two or more airwave frequency intervals, since they would simply use just one of
the allocated offerings.
4. Common values and multidimensional signals
Let us focus on the case where each buyer gets no additional benefit of having
more than one good. Formally, this can be represented in the valuation function
as:
For every i ∈ N , every S = {a1, a2, . . . , ak} ⊆M and every sat ∈ Ti,at :
(4.1) vi,S(sa1 , sa2 , . . . sak) = max
1≤t≤k
vi,at(sat),
i.e. every buyer’s valuation of a set of goods simply equals the valuation of the
highest-valued good in that set.
Throughout this section, assume that n ≥ m, i.e. there are at least as many
buyers as goods. Also assume that the auction designer knows buyer valuations for
each good. This assumption will be dropped in the next section.
We assume that buyers have common values and valuations are linear. More-
over, assume that for any buyer i, the marginal effect of his or her signal on any
other buyer’s valuation for any good is independent of the other buyer and of the
good. This can be translated as:
For any i ∈ N , there exist linear functions fi, wi : R 7→ R such that every wi is
strictly increasing and
(4.2)
vi,K(s1K , s2K , . . . , snK) = wi(siK)+
∑
j 6=i
fj(sjK), ∀K ∈M, ∀(s1K , s2K , . . . snK) ∈ SK
We require that the marginal effect of every buyer’s signal on his or her val-
uation is larger than the marginal effect of the same signal on any other buyer’s
valuation, i.e. for all K ∈M , for all i 6= j and for all (s1K , s2K , . . . snK) ∈ SK
(4.3)
∂vi,K
∂siK
(s1K , s2K , . . . snK) >
∂vj,K
∂siK
(s1K , s2K , . . . , snK),
or equivalently, in light of relation (4.2):
(4.4) w′i(·) > f
′
i(·), ∀i ∈ N
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Finally, we require that all valuations are nonnegative for a given set of buyer
signals S = {siK |i ∈ N,K ∈M}.
(4.5) vi,k(s1k, s2k, . . . snk) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N, ∀k ∈M.
Relation (4.3) is simply an extension of assumption (3.2) in the previous section,
where for simplicity we assumed that it holds for all signal values (s1K , s2K , . . . snK) ∈
SK , and not just when we have
vi,K(s1K , s2K , . . . , snK) = vj,K(s1K , s2K , . . . , snK) = max
t∈N
vt,K(s1K , s2K , . . . , snK).
Since valuations are linear, the two are equivalent.
Let us show that this assumption is in fact necessary. For simplicity and con-
ciceness, we prove the following weaker result:
Lemma 4.1. Consider N buyers, each with signal space Si an open interval of
R for one good that is being auctioned, and valuation functions that are increasing
in each buyer’s signal. If an efficient auction exists, then we must have
∂vi
∂si
(s1, s2, . . . , sn) ≥
∂vj
∂si
(s1, s2, . . . , sn)
at any point where vi(s1, s2, . . . , sn) = vj(s1, s2, . . . , sn) = max
k∈N
vk(s1, s2, . . . , sn)
Proof. Let (σ1, σ2, . . . sn) be a Nash Equilibrium of this auction such that the
good is offered to the buyer with the highest valuation as a result of these strate-
gies, for any signal values (s1, s2, . . . sn) ∈ S1×S2 · · ·×Sn. Assume there is a point
(s1, s2, . . . , sn) for which vi(s1, s2, . . . , sn) = vj(s1, s2, . . . , sn) = max
k∈N
vk(s1, s2, . . . , sn),
and the good is offered to buyer i with positive probability pi as a result of strategies
σ1(s1), σ2(s2), . . . , σn(sn).
Further, let Pi(σ1(s1), σ2(s2), . . . , σn(sn)) be buyer i’s expected payment to the
auction designer for strategies σ1, σ2, . . . , σn and buyer signals (s1, s2, . . . , sn).
If
∂vi
∂si
(s1, s2, . . . , sn) <
∂vj
∂si
(s1, s2, . . . , sn), then there is a point s
′
i ∈ Si such
that s′i > si and
vi(s1, s2, . . . si−1, s
′
i, si+1, . . . sn) < vj(s1, s2, . . . si−1, s
′
i, si+1, . . . sn).
Therefore, as a result of strategies σ1(s1), . . . , σi−1(si−1), σi(s
′
i), σi+1(si+1), . . . , σn(sn),
buyer i is never offered the good.
Since playing σ1, σ2, . . . σn is a Nash Equilibrium, buyer i has no incentive to
play strategy σi(s
′
i) if his or her signal is actually si, and vice-versa, buyer i has
no incentive to play strategy σi(si) if his or her signal is actually s
′
i. This can be
rewritten formally as
pi·vi(s1, . . . si−1, si, si+1, . . . , sn)−Pi(σ1(s1), . . . , σi−1(si−1), σi(si), σi+1(si+1), . . . , σn(sn)) ≥
≥ −Pi(σ1(s1), . . . , σi−1(si−1), σi(s
′
i), σi+1(si+1), . . . , σn(sn))
and
−Pi(σ1(s1), . . . , σi−1(si−1), σi(s
′
i), σi+1(si+1), . . . , σn(sn)) ≥
≥ pi·vi(s1, . . . si−1, s
′
i, si+1, . . . sn)−Pi(σ1(s1), . . . , σi−1(si−1), σi(si), σi+1(si+1), . . . , σn(sn)).
By adding the last two relations we obtain
pi · vi(s1, . . . si−1, si, si+1, . . . sn) ≥ pi · vi(s1, . . . si−1, s
′
i, si+1, . . . sn),
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so dividing by pi and keeping in mind that vi is increasing in si, we obtain that
si ≥ s
′
i, which is a contradiction, since we previously chose s
′
i > si. Therefore the
lemma is proved .
Next let us show that our assumption that a buyer i’s signal has the same
marginal effect on buyer j’s valuation for any good is also necessary. We prove this
for separable, linear valuation functions, again for simplicity:
Lemma 4.2. Assume there are two buyers and two goods {A,B} to be offered,
such that each buyer gains no marginal benefit from having both goods, with buyer
signal spaces represented as open intervals of the real numbers, siA ∈ Si,A, siB ∈
Si,B and positive valuation functions satisfying the following relations for linear
functions w1, w2, f1, f2, g1, g2 :
v1A(s1A, s2A) = w1(s1A) + g1(s2A), v1B(s1B, s2B) = w1(s1B) + g2(s2B),
v2A(s1A, s2A) = w2(s2A) + f1(s1A), v2B(s1B, s2B) = w2(s1B) + f2(s1B),
If there is an efficient auction mechanism then f ′1(·) = f
′
2(·).
Let (σ1, σ2) be a Nash Equilibrium of this auction such that the goods are
allocated according to the welfare-maximizing allocation as a result of strategies
(σ1, σ2). Fix buyer 2’s signals at s2A and s2B , and consider the following two sets
TA and TB, defined as
TA = {(s1A, s1B)|v1A(s1A, s2A) + v2B(s1B, s2B) ≥ v2A(s1A, s2A) + v1B(s1B , s2B)},
TB = {(s1A, s1B)|v1A(s1A, s2A) + v2B(s1B , s2B) ≤ v2A(s1A, s2A) + v1B(s1B, s2B)}.
Since this auction is efficient, good A is offered to buyer 1 with positive proba-
bility if and only if (s1A, s1B) ∈ TA and good B is offered to buyer 1 with positive
probability if (s1A, s1B) ∈ TB. Assume there exist signal values (s2A, s2B) for buyer
2 such that the sets TA and TB are both nonempty. Otherwise, there is only one
possible allocation regardless of the buyers’ signals.
Denoting P1(t1) buyer 1’s expected payment in this auction if he or she plays
strategy σ1 for signal values t1 = (s1A, s1B) and buyer 2 plays σ2(s2A, s2B), first
note that P1(t1) = P1(t
′
1) whenever t1 and t
′
1 are either both in TA or both in
TB, because the auction is efficient and (σ1, σ2) is a Nash Equilibrium. Thus we
can denote PA(s2A, s2B) as buyer 1’s payment if he or she bids such that buyer 1
receives good A, and PB(s2A, s2B) buyer 1’s payment if he or she bids such that
buyer 1 receives good B.
Note that for any two signal pairs t1 = (s1A, s1B), t
′
1 = (s
′
1A, s
′
1B) such that
t1 ∈ TA and t
′
1 ∈ TB, we have
v1A(s1A, s2A)− PA(s2A, s2B) ≥ v1B(s1B, s2B)− PB(s2A, s2B)
and
v1B(s
′
1B, s2B)− PB(s2A, s2B) ≥ v1A(s
′
1A, s2A)− PA(s2A, s2B).
This means that v1A(s1A, s2A)− v1B(s1B , s2B) ≥ PA(s2A, s2B)− PB(s2A, s2B)
if and only if (s1A, s2A) ∈ TA, or equivalently
w1(s1A)− w1(s1B) ≥ PA(s2A, s2B)− PB(s2A, s2B) + g2(s2B)− g1(s2A) ⇐⇒
⇐⇒ w1(s1A)−w1(s1B)−(f1(s1A)−f2(s1B)) ≥ w2(s2A)−w2(s2B)−(g1(s2A)−g2(s2B)).
Note that the right hand side of both inequalities does not depend on buyer
1’s signals. Since we assumed that sets TA and TB are both nonempty, and since
valuations are linear, there exist infinitely many values s1A, s1B such that we have
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equality in the relations above. For those values we have that s1A is a linear function
of s1B and f1(s1A)− f2(s1B) is constant, so indeed f
′
1(·) = f
′
2(·), as desired .
The two lemmas above prove that our assumptions (4.2)− (4.3) are necessary
if we assume separable, linear valuation functions, and thus the only point where
we lose generality is when we assume that valuations are separable and linear.
Finally note the following simple and useful lemma:
Lemma 4.3. If propositions (4.1) and (4.5) hold, then the welfare-maximizing
allocation is one where each buyer receives at most one good.
Proof.
Denote vi,S buyer i’s valuation for a set S of goods.
Assume that M = S1 ⊔S2 ⊔ . . . Sn is a welfare-maximizing allocation, where at
least one set has size greater than 1.
Let Si be one of the sets of size greater than 1, with j = max
k∈Si
vi,k. Since
n∑
j=1
|Sj | = n, at least |Si| − 1 sets among the S1, S2, . . . Sn are empty.
Consider the allocation where buyer i is only assigned good j, and the other
elements of Si are distributed to |Si| − 1 of the buyers who received nothing in the
initial allocation. The overall welfare from this new allocation is at least as big as
the previous one, so by continuing this process we will reach a welfare-maximizing
allocation where each buyer is assigned at most one good .
Let us proceed to the efficient auction mechanism. We split the problem in
two subsections. Throughout the remaining part of this section we assume that
valuation functions satisfy conditions (4.1)− (4.5).
4.1. There is an equal number of buyers and goods. Assume there are
n buyers and n goods, and that all valuation functions are common knowledge.
Consider the following auction setting (Auction 1 ) :
(1) Bidding. Each buyer i submits an n-dimensional vector si = (si1, si2, . . . sin) ∈
R
n. For every K ∈M , denote
(4.6) sK = (s1K , s2K , . . . , snK)
(2) Allocation. Any permutation σ ∈ Pn defines an allocation Sσ = (S1, S2, . . . , Sn)
of the n goods to the n buyers, such that buyer i receives good σ(i), or
equivalently Si = {σ(i)} for all i ∈ N . Under the hypothesis that the
n-dimensional vectors submitted represent buyers’ signals, let σ∗ be the
permutation which describes the welfare-maximizing allocation and as-
sign good σ∗(i) to buyer i, for all i ∈ N . If there are more such possible
permutations, uniformly select one of them at random and assign goods
according to that permutation.
(3) Payment. For a given permutation σ ∈ Pn, let Sσ = (S1, S2, . . . Sn) be
the allocation such that Si = {σ(i)} for all i ∈ N , and let W (Sσ) be the
welfare from allocation Sσ, as defined by (1.4). For any σ ∈ Pn, define
(4.7) Pi(σ) =
w′i(0)
w′i(0)− f
′
i(0)
·W (Sσ)− vi,σ(i)(sσ(i))−
w′i(0)
w′i(0)− f
′
i(0)
·
∑
K∈M
fi(siK)
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If the welfare-maximizing allocation from step (2) is described by the
permutation σ∗, then buyer i makes a payment of
(4.8) max
σ∈Pn
Pi(σ) − Pi(σ
∗)
Assume that valuation functions satisfy conditions (4.1)−(4.5), with the assumption
that functions wi and fi need not be linear, but only satisfy the condition
(4.9)
For any i ∈ N, there exist constants ci, di such that wi(x) = ci ·fi(x)+di, ∀x ∈ R
We will show that under conditions (4.1) − (4.5), and the linearity of wi, fi
replaced with condition (4.9), truthful bidding is a Nash Equilibrium and hence
the auction is efficient. First, let us prove that the auction is well-defined.
From Lemma 4.3, we know that there always exists a welfare-maximizing allo-
cation where each buyer receives exactly one good, therefore the allocation mech-
anism is well-defined and it does provide the maximal overall welfare if buyers bid
truthfully. Let us now deal with the payment function. We prove two lemmas:
Lemma 4.4. If a strictly increasing function wi satisfies conditions (4.4) and
(4.10), then the function
w′i(x)
w′i(x) − fi(x)
is a positive constant.
Proof. Let wi(x) = ci · fi(x) + di. This implies that
w′i(x)
w′i(x)− fi(x)
=
ci
ci − 1
.
Since wi is strictly increasing, we have ci · f
′
i(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R.
Since wi − fi is strictly increasing, we have (ci − 1)f
′
1(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R.
By dividing these two relations, we obtain that
ci
ci − 1
> 0, so indeed
w′i(x)
w′i(x)− fi(x)
is a positive constant .
Lemma 4.5. For any i ∈ N and for any σ ∈ Pn, the value of Pi(σ) defined in
(4.7) does not depend on buyer i’s bid si = (si1, si2, . . . sin).
Let σ(i) = A. Then we can rewrite
Pi(σ) =
ci
ci − 1
·W (Sσ)− vi,A(sA)−
ci
ci − 1
·
∑
K∈M
fi(siK).
Note that for K 6= A, the coefficient of fi(siK) is zero in the expression above,
since the first term of the right hand side provides a coefficient of
ci
ci − 1
, while the
third term provides a coefficient of −
ci
ci − 1
. Let’s look at all terms involving siA:
The first term of the right hand side gives
ci
ci − 1
wi(siA), the second term −wi(siA)
and the third term−
ci
ci − 1
·fi(siA). Therefore, the sum of all the functions involving
siA in the expression Pi(σ) is
ci
ci − 1
wi(siA)− wi(siA)−
ci
ci − 1
fi(siA) =
wi(siA)− cifi(siA)
ci − 1
=
di
ci − 1
,
which is indeed a constant.
Therefore the value of Pi(σ) does not depend on buyer i’s bid si = (si1, si2, . . . sin)
for any i ∈ N, σ ∈ Pn .
We are now ready to prove that this auction is efficient.
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Theorem 4.6. If valuation functions satisfy conditions (4.1) − (4.5), and the
linearity of each wi and fi is replaced by (4.9), then truthful bidding, i.e. bidding
one’s own signal values, represents a Nash Equilibrium of this auction.
Fix a buyer i and assume that every buyer j 6= i bids truthfully, i.e. bids his
or her actual signals for the n goods. We prove that buyer i has no incentive to
deviate from truthful bidding.
Let σ1 be the welfare-maximizing permutation of the goods to buyers given their
true signals, and let σ2 = argmax
σ∈Pn
Pi(σ). If buyer i bids truthfully, the allocation
described by permutation σ1 is selected, and buyer 1 makes a payment of Pi(σ2)−
Pi(σ1), thus his or her overall utility is vi,σ1(i)(sσ1(i)) + Pi(σ1) − Pi(σ2). Using
definition (4.7), this can be rewritten as
(4.10)
ci
ci − 1
(W (Sσ1 )−W (Sσ2 )) + vi,σ2(i)(sσ2(i))
Since σ1 is the welfare-maximizing allocation, and since valuations are nonneg-
ative, the utility obtained from truthful bidding is nonnegative for buyer i, so he
or she has no incentive to not participate in the auction.
Now assume that buyer bids so that goods are allocated according to a permu-
tation σ3. In this case, he or she makes a payment of Pi(σ2)− Pi(σ3) and obtains
a utility of
ci
ci − 1
(W (Sσ3)−W (Sσ2)) + vi,σ2(i)(sσ2(i)).
Therefore, the difference in utility between receiving allocation σ1 and σ3 is
ci
ci − 1
(W (Sσ1 )−W (Sσ2)) ≥ 0, since σ1 is the welfare-maximizing allocation.
Therefore buyer i has no incentive to deviate to bidding such that another
allocation is selected, and since the payment does not depend on his bid, we obtain
that truthful bidding is a best response, and therefore truthful bidding consists
of a Nash Equilibrium. Since the allocation mechanism assigns according to the
welfare-maximizing allocation, this auction mechanism is indeed efficient  .
Let’s apply this mechanism to Example (2) . Recall that there are two goods
to be auctioned, and that valuations are described by
(4.11) v1A(s1A, s2A) = s1A +
1
2
s2A, v1B(s1B , s2B) = s1B +
1
2
s2B
(4.12) v2A(s1A, s2A) = s2A +
1
3
s1A, v2B(s1B , s2B) = s2B +
1
3
s1B
Say that buyer 2 has signals s2A = 2, s2B = 4, and let s1A ≥ −1, s1B ≥ −2
be buyer 1’s signals. If buyer 2 bids truthfully, and buyer 1 bids (s′1A, s
′
1B), then
from the auction designer’s perspective, the apparent welfare from allocation (A,B),
where buyer 1 gets A and buyer 2 gets B, is s′1A+
1
3
s′1B+5 and the apparent welfare
from allocation (B,A), where buyer 1 gets B and buyer 2 gets A is
1
3
s′1A+ s1B +4.
Allocation (A,B) is selected if s′1B − s
′
1A <
3
2
, allocation (B,A) is selected if
s′1B − s
′
1A >
3
2
, and in case s1A− s1B =
3
2
, each allocation has a
1
2
chance of being
selected.
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Let σ1 represent allocation (A,B) and σ2 represent allocation (B,A). Then
P1(σ1) =
13
2
, P1(σ2) = 4, and therefore buyer 1 faces the following decision :
(1) If s′1B − s
′
1A <
3
2
, buyer 1 makes a payment of zero, and obtains utility
s1A + 1 .
(2) If s′1B − s
′
1A >
3
2
, buyer 1 makes a payment of
13
2
− 4 =
5
2
, and obtains
utility s1B −
1
2
.
(3) If s′1B − s
′
1A =
3
2
, buyer 1 makes an expected payment of
5
4
, and obtains
expected utility
s1A + s1B
2
−
1
4
.
Note from above that buyer 1 is strictly better off from bidding (1) if and only
if s1B − s1A <
3
2
, that he or she is strictly better off from bidding (2) if and only if
s1B − s1A >
3
2
, and that he or she is indifferent to the three strategies if and only
if s1B − s1A =
1
3
.
Since bidding s′1A = s1A and s
′
1B = s1B satisfies the conditions above, it is
indeed a best response: there is no other bidding strategy that could make buyer 1
better off.
Let us now move on to the second case.
4.2. There are strictly more buyers than goods. Assume there are n
buyers and m < n goods, and that all valuation functions are common knowledge.
Consider the following auction setting:
(1) Bidding. Each buyer i submits anm- dimensional vector si = (si1, si2, . . . sim) ∈
R
m .For every K ∈M , denote
(4.13) sK = (s1K , s2K , . . . , snK)
(2) Allocation. Given the vectors that the buyers submitted, the goods are
allocated according to the welfare-maximizing allocation (S1, S2, . . . Sn)
under the hypothesis that for every buyer, the vector that he or she sub-
mitted represents his or her signal values, and under the condition that
each buyer receives at most one good. If such an allocation is not unique,
uniformly select one of the welfare-maximizing allocations at random.
(3) Payment. Assume that the above allocation assigns each good K ∈ M
to bidder iK , such that for every A,B ∈ M with A 6= B, we have
iA ∈ N, iB ∈ N, iA 6= iB. For a given buyer i, the following mechanism
describes his or her payment:
i) If buyer i is not assigned any good, buyer i makes no payment
ii) If buyer i is assigned good K, consider the welfare optimizing
allocation of goods from the set M to the buyers in the set N − {i}
according to the same rules as in step (2) above. Assume that under this
new allocation, good A is assigned to buyer jA 6= i, such that for every
A,B ∈M with A 6= B, we have jA ∈ N, jB ∈ N, jA 6= jB . Buyer i pays
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(4.14) vi,K(s1K , s2K , . . . , s(i−1)K , s
∗
iK , s(i+1)K , . . . , snK),
where s∗iK solves the following equation:
vi,K(s1K , s2K , . . . , s(i−1)K , s
∗
iK , s(i+1)K , . . . , snK) +
∑
A∈M,A 6=K
viA,A(sA) =
(4.15) vjK ,K(s1K , s2K , . . . , s(i−1)K , s
∗
iK , s(i+1)K , . . . snK) +
∑
A∈M,A 6=K
vjA,A(sA),
where sA = (s1A, s2A, . . . , snA), for any A ∈M , as in relation (4.13)
We claim that truthful bidding is a Nash Equilibrium of this auction. In turn,
this would imply that the auction is efficient, given the allocation mechanism above.
First, let us prove that the auction is well-defined.
From lemma (4.3), we know that we will always find an allocation satisfying
condition (2) of our auction. Let us next prove that the payment mechanism is
well-defined.
Lemma 4.7. Equation (4.14) has a unique solution s∗iK and the payment
vi,K(s1K , s2K , . . . , s(i−1)K , s
∗
iK , s(i+1)k, . . . snK) does not depend on buyer i’s
bid si = (si1, si2, . . . sim) .
Proof. Using the linearity condition (4.2), relation (4.14) can be rewritten as
wi(s
∗
iK) +
∑
t6=i
ft(stK) +
∑
A∈M,A 6=K
viA,A(sA) =
wjK (sjKK) + fi(s
∗
iK) +
∑
i6=t6=jK
ft(stK) +
∑
A∈M,A 6=K
vjA,A(sA),
or equivalently
(4.16)
wi(s
∗
iK) + fjK (sjKK)− wjK (SjKK)− fi(s
∗
iK) =
∑
A∈M,A 6=K
(viA,A(sA)− vjA,A(sA))
Note again from the linearity condition (4.2) that even though viA,A(sA) de-
pends on siA because of the additive term fi(siA), the difference viA,A(sA) −
vjA,A(sA) does not. Therefore, neither the left nor the right hand side of rela-
tion (3.8) depend on any of the signals si1, si2, . . . sim.
Moreover, relation (4.16) is linear in s∗iK , so it indeed has a unique solution .
Let us prove another useful lemma:
Lemma 4.8. The welfare optimizing allocation of the goods in M to the buyers
N−{i} does not depend on buyer i’s signal values, even though individual valuations
do.
Proof. Let sA = (s1A, s2A, . . . , snA), for any A ∈ M , as in relation (4.13).
Consider two allocations, one where every good K ∈ M is assigned to buyer iK ∈
N − {i}, such that for all A,B ∈ M,A 6= B we have iA 6= iB, and another
allocation where every good K ∈ M is assigned to buyer jK ∈ N − {i}, such that
for all A,B ∈M,A 6= B we have jA 6= jB.
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The difference in welfare between the two allocations is
∑
K∈M
viK ,K(sK)−
∑
K∈M
vjK ,K(sK) =
∑
K∈M
(viK ,K(sK)− vjK ,K(sK)) .
Since jK 6= i 6= iK for all K ∈ M , we obtain from condition (4.2) that each term
viK ,K(sK) − vjK ,K(sK) of the sum above does not depend on siK . Therefore the
welfare ordering between allocations of the goods in M to buyers in N − {i} does
not depend on buyer i’s signal, as desired .
We are now ready to prove our main result.
Theorem 4.9. Truthful bidding, i.e. bidding one’s own signal values for every
good is a Nash Equilibrium under the auction design presented above.
Proof. Let i ∈ N be one of the buyers, and assume that every other buyer j 6= i
bids truthfully, i.e. for all K ∈ M , the signal sjK that buyer j submits is actually
buyer j’s signal value for good K.
Let us prove that truthful bidding is a best response for buyer i .
We encounter two cases:
(1) If buyer i bids truthfully, he or she obtains a good.
(2) If buyer i bids truthfully, he or she does not obtain any of the goods.
Let us deal with Case 1 first:
First assume that the welfare-maximizing allocation of goods M to buyers
M − {i} is such that buyer jA receives good A, for all goods A ∈M .
Assume that under truthful bidding, buyer i receives good K, while for all
A 6= K, buyer iA receives good A. Since all buyers bid truthfully, this represents
the ex-ante welfare-maximizing allocation.
In this case, buyer i receives good K and has to pay
viK(s1K , s2K , . . . , s(i−1)K , s
∗
iK , s(i+1)K , . . . snK), where s
∗
iK solves
wi(s
∗
iK) + fjK (sjKK)− wjK (SjKK)− fi(s
∗
iK) =
∑
A∈M,A 6=K
(viA,A(sA)− vjA,A(sA)) .
Therefore buyer i’s utility in this auction is his or her valuation minus the
payment, which simplifies to wi(siK) − wi(s
∗
iK) because of the linearity condition
(4.2).
We will prove that no bidding for buyer i can result in a higher utility. We will
consider two subcases:
i. buyer i bids so that he or she does not receive any goods
ii. buyer i bids so that he or she receives good L (which may or may not be
the same as good K, the one obtained from truthful bidding)
We deal with these cases one by one.
Consider
f(t) = vi,K(s1K , s2K , . . . , s(i−1)K , siK − t, s(i+1)K , . . . snK) +
∑
A∈M,A 6=K
viA,A(sA)−
−vjK ,K(s1K , s2K , . . . , s(i−1)K , siK − t, s(i+1)K , . . . snK)−
∑
A∈M,A 6=K
vjA,A(sA)
Observe that we can use relation (4.16) to simplify f(t) to
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f(t) = wi(siK−t)+fjK (sjKK)−wjK (SjKK)−fi(siK−t)+
∑
A∈M,A 6=K
(viA,A(sA)− vjA,A(sA)) .
Note that f ′(t) = f ′i(siK − t) − w
′
i(siK − t) < 0 for all t ∈ R so from relation
(4.4), f is decreasing.
Also observe that f(siK − s
∗
iK) = 0.
Finally, note that f(0) =Wi−Wj , whereWi is the welfare obtained when good
K is assigned to buyer i and every good A 6= K is assigned to buyer iA, and Wj
is the welfare obtained by allocating the goods in M to buyers N − {i} such that
good A ∈M is assigned to buyer jA.
Since Wi is the welfare obtained from truthful bidding, it is higher than all
other welfares, so f(0) ≥ 0, and therefore f(0) ≥ f(siK−s
∗
iK). But f is decreasing,
so siK ≥ s
∗
iK , which implies wi(siK)− wi(s
∗
iK) ≥ 0.
Let us deal with the 2 subcases now:
Subcase i. buyer i bids so that he or she does not receive any goods.
In this case buyer i’s utility is zero, which is not greater than the utility obtained
by truthful bidding, wi(siK)−wi(s
∗
iK). Therefore buyer i does not have an incentive
to deviate to this case .
Subcase ii. Assume buyer i sends signals s′i = (s
′
i1, s
′
i2, . . . , s
′
im), such that the
resulting allocation gives good L to buyer i and good A ∈ M to buyer i′A, for all
A 6= L.
Therefore, buyer i receives good L and has to pay
viL(s1L, s2L, . . . , s(i−1)L, s
∗∗
iL, s(i+1)L, . . . snL), where s
∗∗
iL solves
wi(s
∗∗
iL) + fjL(sjLL)− wjL(SjLL)− fi(s
∗∗
iL) =
∑
A∈M,A 6=L
(
vi′
A
,A(sA)− vjA,A(sA)
)
.
Therefore, if buyer i bids truthfully, he or she obtains utility wi(siK)−wi(s
∗
iK),
while in this case he or she obtains utility wi(siL)− wi(s
∗∗
iL) .
Consider
g(t) = vi,L(s1L, s2L, . . . , s(i−1)L, siL − t, s(i+1)L, . . . snL) +
∑
A∈M,A 6=L
vi′
A
,A(sA)−
−vjL,L(s1L, s2L, . . . , s(i−1)L, siL − t, s(i+1)L, . . . snL)−
∑
A∈M,A 6=L
vjA,A(sA)
Observe that we can use relation (4.16) to simplify g(t) to
g(t) = wi(siL−t)+fjL(sjLL)−wjL(SjLL)−fi(siL−t)+
∑
A∈M,A 6=L
(
vi′
A
,A(sA)− vjA,A(sA)
)
.
Note that g′(t) = f ′i(siL − t) − w
′
i(siL − t) < 0 for all t ∈ R so from relation
(4.4), g is decreasing. Moreover, since the functions fi and wi are linear, we obtain
g′(t) = f ′(t) for every t ∈ R, so the function f(t)− g(t) is constant.
Also observe that g(siL − s
∗∗
iL) = 0.
Finally, note that g(0) = Wi′ −Wj , where Wi′ is the welfare obtained when
good L is assigned to buyer i and every good A 6= L is assigned to buyer i′A, and
Wj is the welfare obtained by allocating the goods in M to buyers N − {i} such
that good A ∈M is assigned to buyer jA.
Since truthful bidding results in the welfare-maximizing allocation, we have
Wi ≥Wi′ , so f(0)− g(0) =Wi −Wi′ ≥ 0. Therefore f(t) ≥ g(t) for all t ∈ R.
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This implies that
f(siL − s
∗∗
iL) ≥ g(siL − s
∗∗
iL) = 0 = f(siK − s
∗
iK),
so siK − s
∗
iK ≥ siL − siL ∗ ∗, which in turn implies
wi(siK)− wi(s
∗
iK) ≥ wi(siL)− wi(s
∗
iL∗),
therefore buyer i has no incentive to deviate to this case .
Therefore if buyer i bids truthfully and he or she is assigned a good, there is
no strategy which would make him or her better off.
Now we deal with the second case:
Case 2. If buyer i bids truthfully and he or she does not obtain any of the
goods.
In this case, if buyer i bids truthfully, he or she obtains zero utility. We shall
prove that no other strategy gives a higher utility. The reasoning is very similar to
subcase 2 above.
Assume buyer i sends signals s′i = (s
′
i1, s
′
i2, . . . , s
′
im), such that the resulting
allocation gives good L to buyer i and good A ∈M to buyer i′A, for all A 6= L.
Therefore, buyer i receives good L and has to pay
viL(s1L, s2L, . . . , s(i−1)L, s
∗∗
iL, s(i+1)L, . . . snL), where s
∗∗
iL solves
wi(s
∗∗
iL) + fjL(sjLL)− wjL(SjLL)− fi(s
∗∗
iL) =
∑
A∈M,A 6=L
(
vi′
A
,A(sA)− vjA,A(sA)
)
.
Therefore, if buyer i bids truthfully, he or she obtains utility 0, while in this
case he or she obtains utility wi(siL)− wi(s
∗∗
iL) .
Consider
h(t) = vi,L(s1L, s2L, . . . , s(i−1)L, siL − t, s(i+1)L, . . . snL) +
∑
A∈M,A 6=L
vi′
A
,A(sA)−
−vjL,L(s1L, s2L, . . . , s(i−1)L, siL − t, s(i+1)L, . . . snL)−
∑
A∈M,A 6=L
vjA,A(sA)
Observe that we can use relation (4.16) to simplify h(t) to
h(t) = wi(siL−t)+fjL(sjLL)−wjL(SjLL)−fi(siL−t)+
∑
A∈M,A 6=L
(
vi′
A
,A(sA)− vjA,A(sA)
)
.
Note that h′(t) = f ′i(siL− t)−w
′
i(siL− t) < 0 for all t ∈ R, from relation (4.4),
so h is decreasing.
Also observe that h(siL − s
∗∗
iL) = 0.
Moreover, h(0) = Wi′ −Wj , where Wi′ is the welfare obtained if good L is
assigned to buyer i and good A 6= L is assigned to buyer iA, and Wj is the welfare
obtained by allocating the goods inM to buyersN−{i} such that goodA is assigned
to buyer jA. Since truthful bidding provides the welfare-maximizing allocation,
since truthful bidding assigns no goods to buyer i, and since Wj is the highest
possible welfare obtained from allocating goods in M to buyers N −{i}, we obtain
that Wj is the highest possible welfare obtained from allocating goods in M to all
the N buyers. Therefore Wi′ −Wj ≤ 0, so h(0) ≤ 0. This implies that
h(0) ≤ h(siL − s
∗∗
iL), so siL ≤ s
∗∗
iL, which finally implies that
wi(siL)−wi(s
∗∗
iL) ≤ 0, therefore buyer i has no incentive to deviate from truthful
bidding, since he or she will not obtain a higher utility .
Therefore Theorem 4.7 is proved, and the auction mechanism is indeed efficient.
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Let us consider an application of this auction, for 3 buyers and 2 goods, A,B.
Assume that valuation functions can be described as
(4.17)
v1A(s1A, s2A, s3A) = s1A +
1
2
s2A +
1
3
s3A, v1B(s1B, s2B , s3B) = s1B +
1
2
s2B +
1
2
s3B
(4.18)
v2A(s1A, s2A, s3A) =
1
2
s1A + s2A +
1
3
s3A, v2B(s1B, s2B , s3B) =
1
2
s1B + s2B +
1
2
s3B
(4.19)
v3A(s1A, s2A, s3A) =
1
2
s1A +
1
2
s2A + s3A, v3B(s1B, s2B , s3B) =
1
2
s1B +
1
2
s2B + s3B
Let s2A = 2, s2B = 2, s3A = 3, s3B = 6, and s1A, s1B > 0. Note that these
valuation functions satisfy our conditions (4.1)− (4.5). Using the specific examples
above, the valuations can be rewritten as
v1A(s1A) = s1A + 2, v1B(s1B) = s1B + 3
v2A(s1A) =
1
2
s1A + 3, v2B(s1B) =
1
2
s1B + 4
v3A(s1A) =
1
2
s1A + 4, v3B(s1B) =
1
2
s1B + 7
We describe an allocation by (X1, X2, X3) if buyer i receives the goods in set
Xi. Assume that buyers 2 and 3 bid truthfully, and that buyer 1 bids (s
′
1A, s
′
1B).
Given the valuations above, there are 3 possible allocations which maximize welfare
from the auction designer’s point of view:
(1) (A, ∅, B) if s′1A ≥ max(2, s
′
1B − 4).
(2) (B, ∅, A) if s′1B ≥ max(6, s
′
1A − 4).
(3) (∅, A,B) if s′1A ≤ 2, s
′
1B ≤ 6.
Note that the welfare-maximizing allocation of the 2 goods to buyers {2, 3} is
(∅, A,B).
If buyer 1 bids so that he or she receives good A, then the value of s∗1A from
relation (4.15) is 2, and buyer 1 has to make a payment of v1A(2) = 4.
If buyer 1 bids so that he or she receives good B, then the value of s∗1B from
relation (4.15) is 6, and buyer 1 has to make a payment of v1B(6) = 9.
Therefore, buyer 1 has to choose between the following allocations and pay-
ments:
(1) If allocation (1) is selected, buyer 1 gets good A and obtains a utility of
s1A − 2.
(2) If allocation (2) is selected, buyer 1 gets good B and obtains a utility of
s1B − 6.
(3) If allocation (3) is selected, buyer 1 gets nothing and obtains a utility of
zero.
We observe that allocation (1) provides the highest utility for buyer 1 if and
only if s1A ≥ max(2, s1B − 4), allocation (2) provides the highest utility for buyer
1 if and only if s1B ≥ max(6, s1A − 4), and allocation (3) provides the highest
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utility for buyer 1 if and only if s1A ≤ 2, s1B ≤ 6. Note that these conditions
are symmetric to the allocation rules presented previously, and therefore truthful
bidding is indeed optimal, so this auction is efficient.
Note that in this section we have assumed that the auction designer is aware
of the functional forms of buyer valuations. We show that this condition is not
necessary, by presenting an auction mechanism where the designer does not know
buyer functional forms. They are only known amongst each buyer.
5. Common values and multidimensional signals with no prior
knowledge from the auction designer
Assume, as in the previous section, that there is a set of M goods to be dis-
tributed to a group of N buyers, and that assumptions (4.1)− (4.5) and (4.9) hold.
The buyers observe their own signals, but do not know the other buyers’ signals.
However, every buyer knows every other buyer’s valuation functions. Since each
valuation is linear, if a buyer i knew the specific valuation that every other buyer
had, he or she would obtain a system of equations with information about other
buyers’ valuation components. This could lead the buyer to discover the relevant
components of his or her own valuation function. This rationalle, if properly ap-
plied, can be used to construct a mechanism where the true valuation functions and
signals are revealed under truthful bidding, without requiring the auction designer
to know any valuation function of the buyers. In fact, the only thing that the
auction designer knows is that buyer valuations satisfy conditions (4.2) and (4.9).
These assumptions are not necessary, but they will simplify the mechanism, and
since the buyers do in fact have separable valuations, it does not seem farfetched
to assume that the auction designer is aware of that.
This section builds upon the previous 2 sections, using a similar method as [6].
Assume for simplicity that SK = R
n, for all K ∈M , i.e. every signal can take
on any real value, for any good and any buyer.
Once again we assume that valuation functions are separable and that the
marginal effect that every buyer has on the valuations of other buyers is independent
of the good or of the buyer, i.e. there exist functions wi, fi such that for all i ∈ N
and for all K ∈M ,
(5.1)
vi,K(s1K , s2K , . . . , snK) = wi(siK)+
∑
j 6=i
fj(sjK), ∀K ∈M, ∀(s1K , s2K , . . . snK) ∈ SK
Moreover, assume as before that each function wi is a linear transformation of
fi, i.e. there exist constants ci, di such that ci > 1 and
(5.2) wi(x) = cifi(x) + di, for all x ∈ R.
Fix a good A ∈M and a buyer i ∈ N . Assume that each buyer j has a valuation
function vj,A. We say that a linear function biA : R
n−1 7→ R represents truthful
bidding for buyer i with signal siA if there exist real numbers xi1, xi2, . . . xin such
that for any v−i = (v1, v2, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn) ∈ R
n−1, we have
(5.3) biA(v−i) = xii +
∑
j 6=i
xij · vj
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and
(5.4) biA(v1A(sA), v2A(sA), . . . , v(i−1)A(sA), v(i+1)A(sA), . . . , vnA(sA)) = viA(sA),
for all vectors sA = (s1A, s2A, . . . , s(i−1)A, siA, . . . , snA) ∈ R
n . Note that siA
is fixed, while all other signal values are not.
The following lemma will be very useful:
Lemma 5.1. Fix a good A ∈ M , and a buyer i ∈ N with signal siA. If buyer
valuations satisfy relations (5.1) and (5.2), and if functions fj are continuous and
nonconstant for all j 6= i, j ∈ N , then a truthful bidding function satisfying condi-
tions (5.3) and (5.4) exists and is unique.
Proof. Assume there exists a truthful bid function satisfying conditions (5.3)
and (5.4). Then condition (5.4) can be rewritten as
xii +
∑
j 6=i
xij ·

wj(sjA) +
∑
t6=j
ft(stA)

 = wi(siA) +
∑
j 6=i
fj(sjA),
or equivalently
(5.5) xii+
∑
j 6=i
xij ·

cj · fj(sjA) + dj +
∑
t6=j
ft(stA)

 = ci ·fi(siA)+di+
∑
j 6=i
fj(sjA),
for all vectors sA = (s1A, s2A, . . . , s(i−1)A, siA, . . . , snA) ∈ R
n .
Regroup all the coefficients of every term fj(sjA) in the relation above, and
denote X−i = (xi1, xi2, . . . xi(i−1), xi(i+1), . . . xin) .
Also, for every j 6= i, let Cj =


1
...
1
cj
...
1


be the 1 × (n − 1) vector with jth
component equal to cj and all other components equal to 1. Then relation (5.5)
can be rewritten as
(5.6) xii−ci ·fi(siA)−di+
∑
j 6=i
xij · (dj + fi(siA))+
∑
j 6=i
fj(sjA) (X−i · Cj − 1) = 0,
for all vectors sA = (s1A, s2A, . . . , s(i−1)A, siA, . . . , snA) ∈ R
n . Note that each term
X−i ·Cj represents the product of an (n− 1)× 1 vector with a 1× (n− 1) vector.
Since relation (5.6) holds for all values s1A, s2A, . . . s(i−1)A, s(i+1)A, . . . , snA,
and since functions fj are continuous and nonconstant, we must have X−i ·Cj = 1
for all j 6= i, and xii = ci · fi(siA) + di −
∑
j 6=i
xij · dj . These conditions can be
rewritten as
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(5.7) (xi1, xi2, . . . xi(i−1), xi(i+1), . . . xin)·


c1 1 . . . 1 1
1 c2 . . . 1 1
...
1 1 . . . 1 cn

 = (1, 1, . . . , 1)
and
(5.8) xii = fi(siA)

ci −
∑
j 6=i
xij

+ di −
∑
j 6=i
xij · dj
The matrix in relation (5.7) has elements cj , j 6= i in order on the main di-
agonal, and 1s elsewhere. Since the elements ci are all strictly greater than 1, the
determinant of the matrix in (5.7) is strictly positive, so relation (5.7) uniquely
determines coefficients xij for j 6= i. Further, relation (5.8) now determines xii, so
the truthful bidding function is indeed unique, and so the lemma is proved .
Note that we do not in fact need the functions fi to be continuous and non-
constant: we merely desire that the set of all values of functions fj(sjA) have full
dimension n− 1 in Rn−1.
Let us now prove some more interesting properties of the coefficients of truthful
bidding functions.
Lemma 5.2. Consider the following system of equations :
a1 · x1 + x2 + x3 + · · ·+ xn = 1 (1)
x1 + a2 · x2 + x3 + · · ·+ xn = 1 (2)
x1 + x2 + a3 · x3 + · · ·+ xn = 1 (3)
...
x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xi−1 + ai · xi + xi+1 + · · ·+ xn = 1 (i)
...
x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn−1 + an · xn = 1 (n)
If all coefficients ai are strictly greater than 1, then each xi is strictly positive.
Proof. First note that by subtracting relations (i) and (j) we obtain
(ai−1) ·xi = (aj−1) ·xj , so all the numbers xi have the same sign, and none of
them can be zero, because if at least one of them is zero, then all of them are zero,
and the system of equations is no longer satisfied. Also, the numbers xi cannot be
negative, because in that case a1 · x1 + x2 + x3 + · · ·+ xn < 0, again contradicting
the system of equations.
Therefore the solution (x1, x2, . . . , xn) to this system of equations has all com-
ponents strictly positive.
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Note that if coefficients (xi1, xi2, . . . xin) determine the truthful bidding func-
tion of buyer i with signal siA, then the xii component is the only one which can
differ as a function of buyer 1’s signal siA, while the other components satisfy the
property
(5.9)
1
xij
·

1−
∑
j 6=t6=i
xit

 = cj , for all j 6= i, j ∈ N
We are now ready to describe our efficient auction mechanisms. Again assume
that there are at least as many buyers as goods, and split the problem in two parts.
5.1. There is an equal number of buyers and goods. Consider the fol-
lowing auction mechanism (Auction 3 ):
(1) Bidding. For every good A ∈ M , every buyer i ∈ N submits a linear bid
function biA : R
n−1 7→ R, such that for any v−i = (v1, v2, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn) ∈
R
n−1, we have
(5.10) biA(v−i) = x
(A)
ii +
∑
j 6=i
x
(A)
ij · vj ,
for some coefficients x
(A)
i1 , x
(A)
i2 , . . . x
(A)
in ∈ R
(2) Allocation. The goods in M are allocated if and only for every good
A ∈ M , x
(A)
ij 6= 0 for all i 6= j, and for every buyer j ∈ N , there exists a
value c′j > 1 such that
(5.11)
1
x
(A)
ij
·

1−
∑
j 6=t6=i
x
(A)
it

 = 1
x
(A)
kj
·

1−
∑
j 6=t6=k
x
(A)
kt

 = c′j , for all A ∈M, i, k ∈ N and i, k 6= j
For each goodA ∈M , consider the fixed point v◦A = (v
◦
1A, v
◦
2A, . . . , v
◦
nA),
such that for all i ∈ N :
(5.12) biA(v
◦
1A, v
◦
2A, . . . , v
◦
(i−1)A, v
◦
(i+1)A, . . . v
◦
nA) = v
◦
iA
Each allocation of the goods to the buyers corresponds to a permuta-
tion σ ∈ Pn such that buyer i receives good σ(i). Under the assumption
that v◦iA represents buyer i’s valuation of good A, let σ
∗ be the welfare-
maximizing allocation of the goods in M to the buyers in N . Then buyer
i receives good σ∗(i).
(3) Payment. Define W (σ) =
∑
j∈N
v◦jσ(j), the apparent welfare from allocation
σ. Finally, let
(5.13) Pi(σ) =
c′i
c′i − 1
·W (σ)− v◦iσ(i) +
c′i
c′i − 1
·
1
c′i −
∑
j 6=i
xij
·
∑
A∈M
x
(A)
ii
If σ∗ is the welfare-maximizing allocation selected in step 2, buyer i
pays
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(5.14) max
σ∈Pn
Pi(σ) − Pi(σ
∗)
Let’s prove that this auction is well-defined. First of all, note that condition (5.11)
is equivalent to saying that condition (5.9) holds for every buyer k 6= j. This
forces buyers to bid as if they believe that
∂wi
∂fi
= c′i for all i ∈ N . Therefore,
bid functions satisfying relation (5.11) correspond to truthful bidding functions in
the case
∂wi
∂fi
= c′i, while the free terms x
(A)
ii correspond to each buyer’s value of
fi(siA), from relation (5.8). Let us prove another useful lemma:
Lemma 5.3. If bid functions respect condition (5.11), then there is a unique
fixed point satisfying (5.12) .
Proof.
Let (v1, v2, . . . vn) be a fixed point satisfying (5.12) for a given good A, and
write xij instead of x
(A)
ij for simplicity. (5.12) This is equivalent to
(5.15)


−1 x12 x13 . . . x1n
x21 −1 x23 . . . x2n
...
xn1 xn2 xn3 . . . −1

 ·


v1
v2
...
vn

 =


−x11
−x22
...
−xnn


However, note that from (5.11) we obtain


−1 x12 x13 . . . x1n
x21 −1 x23 . . . x2n
...
xn1 xn2 xn3 . . . −1

 ·


c′1 1 1 . . . 1
1 c′2 1 . . . 1
...
1 1 1 . . . c′n

 =
(5.16) =


−c′1 +
∑
j 6=1
x1j 0 0 . . . 0
0 −c′2 +
∑
j 6=2
x2j 0 . . . 0
...
0 0 0 . . . −c′n +
∑
j 6=n
xnj


,
The latter matrix is zero everywhere except on the main diagonal, where entry
i equals −c′i+
∑
j 6=i
xij . Using lemma (5.2) for coefficients c
′
i in (5.11), we obtain that
−c′i+
∑
j 6=i
xij < 0 for all i. Therefore the matrix is invertible, and hence the matrix
in relation (5.15) is invertible, so there always exists a fixed point given condition
(5.11), and that fixed point is unique .
Note that since c′i >
∑
j 6=i
xij , equation (5.13) is also well-defined.
Finally, note that given values xi1, xi2, . . . xin, d1, d2, . . . dn, c
′
i, there is a unique
x ∈ R with x = fi(siA′), for some s
′
iA ∈ R, such that
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(5.17) xii = fi(siA)

c′i −
∑
j 6=i
xij

+ di −
∑
j 6=i
xij · dj
This means that equation (5.8) completely determines fi(siA), and if the func-
tion fi is injective, this uniquely determines signal s
′
iA for which equation (5.8)
holds. If additionally Im(fi) = R, then any value of xii corresponds to a different
signal value s′iA for which (5.17) holds.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this subsection.
Theorem 5.4. Assume n ≥ 3. If valuation functions satisfy conditions (4.1)−
(4.5), (5.2) and if each function fi is injective and Im(fi) = R, then truthful bidding
is a Nash Equilibrium of Auction 3, and the auction is efficient.
Proof. Assume that each buyer j has signal sjA for a given good A ∈ M , and
assume that each buyer j 6= i bids truthfully, i.e. bids according to (5.8) and (5.9).
Then condition (5.11) is satisfied for buyers j 6= i, and the constants are ci.
We distinguish two simple cases:
1. buyer i bids linear functions such that at least one of them does not satisfy
(5.11). In this case no good is allocated, and so buyer i receives zero utility.
2. buyer i bids linear functions satisfying (5.11). Hence, the only freedom
that buyer i has is in choosing coefficients x
(A)
ii , and since each coefficient x
(A)
ii
corresponds to a different signal value s′iA, buyer i is essentially bidding truthfully
as if his or her signal were s′iA, and every other buyer j 6= i bids truthfully his or her
signal sjA for every A ∈ M . Therefore the fixed points simply represent valuation
functions for each buyer and each good A as if buyer i has signal s′iA and every
other buyer j has signal sjA.
In this case, the allocation rule in this auction is equivalent to the allocation rule
in Auction 1 in section 4, while the payment rule is also equivalent to the payment
rule in Auction 1 . Note that definition (5.13) of Pσ is the same as condition (4.7)
except for a constant term m ·
ci
ci − 1
·
1
ci −
∑
j 6=i
xij

di −
∑
j 6=i
xij · dj

, which gets
cancelled out when considering the final payment (5.17).
Therefore, in this second case, our Auction 3 is equivalent to Auction 1, where
every buyer receives nonnegative utility, so there is no incentive to deviate to case
1 above, and truthful bidding represents is a best response of buyer i, as desired.
Therefore truthful bidding is indeed a Nash Equilibrium of this auction, and
the auction is efficient .
Note that if n = 2, condition (5.11) does not uniquely determine x12 for buyer
1, since there is only one buyer for which the relation holds. Thus the reasoning
above does not hold. Nevertheless, there is an efficient auction mechanism in this
case : keep the bidding and allocation rules the same, but define the payment in
the following way:
Assume the buyers are 1, 2 and the goods A,B . Let σ1 represent allocation
(A,B) and σ2 represent allocation (B,A), with σ1(1) = σ2(2) = A, σ1(2) = σ2(1) =
B. For allocation σ ∈ P2, where buyer i receives good σ(i), define
26 ANDREI LAURENTIU CIUPAN
(5.18) Pi(σ) =
c′i
c′i − 1
· x
σ(j)
jj
If allocation σ∗ is selected, buyer i pays
(5.19) max (Pi(σ1), Pi(σ2))− Pi(σ
∗)
Truthful bidding is a Nash Equilibrium of this allocation because, if buyer 2
plays truthfully, then xA22 − x
B
22 =
c1 · c2 − 1
c1
(f2(s2A)− f2(s2B)), and
P1(σ1)− P1(σ2) =
c1 · c2 − 1
c1 − 1
(f2(s2B)− f2(s2A)).
Thus buyer 1 has an incentive to bid so that allocation σ1 is selected if and
only if
c1 · f1(s1A) + f2(s2A) + P1(σ1) ≥ c1 · f1(s1B) + f2(s2B) + P1(σ2)
⇐⇒ c1(f1(s1A)− f1(s1B)) ≥
c1(c2 − 1)
c1 − 1
,
which holds if and only if the overall welfare from allocation σ1 is higher than the
overall welfare from allocation σ2.
Thus truthful bidding is a best response for buyer 1 if buyer 2 truthfully, and
since the argument is symmetric, truthful bidding does indeed constitute a Nash
Equilibrium.
Let us now deal with the case of more buyers than goods.
5.2. There are more buyers than goods. Assume there is a set N of n
buyers and a set M of m goods, with n > m.
Consider the following auction mechanism (Auction 4 ):
(1) Bidding. For every good A ∈ M , every buyer i ∈ N submits a linear bid
function biA : R
n−1 7→ R, such that for any v−i = (v1, v2, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn) ∈
R
n−1, we have
(5.20) biA(v−i) = x
(A)
ii +
∑
j 6=i
x
(A)
ij · vj ,
for some coefficients x
(A)
i1 , x
(A)
i2 , . . . x
(A)
in ∈ R
(2) Allocation. The goods in M are allocated if and only for every good
A ∈ M , x
(A)
ij 6= 0 for all i 6= j, and for every buyer j ∈ N , there exists a
value c′j > 1 such that
(5.21)
1
x
(A)
ij
·

1−
∑
j 6=t6=i
x
(A)
it

 = 1
x
(A)
kj
·

1−
∑
j 6=t6=k
x
(A)
kt

 = c′j , for all A ∈M, i, k ∈ N and i, k 6= j
For each goodA ∈M , consider the fixed point v◦A = (v
◦
1A, v
◦
2A, . . . , v
◦
nA),
such that for all i ∈ N :
(5.22) biA(v
◦
1A, v
◦
2A, . . . , v
◦
(i−1)A, v
◦
(i+1)A, . . . v
◦
nA) = v
◦
iA.
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Under the assumtion that the ith component of fixed point vector
v◦A represents each buyer i’s valuation of good A, let S = (S1, S2, . . . Sn)
be the the welfare-maximizing allocation, such that any good A ∈ M is
offered to buyer iA ∈ N , and each buyer receives at most one good. Then
goods are offered according to allocation S.
(3) Payment. If buyer i was assigned no goods at step 2 above, he or she
pays nothing. If buyer i was assigned good A based on step (2) above, let
S′−i = (S
′
1, S
′
2, . . . , S
′
n) be the apparent welfare-maximizing allocation of
the goods in M to the buyers N −{i}, according to the same assumptions
as in step 2, such that every good K is assigned to buyer jK .
Remember that S is the welfare-maximizing allocation according to
the fixed points in (2.2), and assume buyer i receives good A, and every
good K 6= A is offered to buyer iK .
Consider the bidding xA∗ii which would induce the fixed point v
∗
A =
(v∗1A, v
∗
2A, . . . , v
∗
nA) satisfying the fixed point condition (5.22) and
(5.23) v∗iA +
∑
K 6=A
v◦iKK = v
∗
jAA
+
∑
K 6=A
v◦jKK
Then buyer i pays v∗iA.
Based on our work on the previous auction, it is easy to prove that this auction
is efficient.
Theorem 5.5. If valuation functions satisfy conditions (4.1)− (4.5), (5.2) and
if each function fi is injective and Im(fi) = R, then truthful bidding is a Nash
Equilibrium of Auction 4, and the auction is efficient.
Proof.
We simply note that again, if n ≥ 3 and all buyers but i bid truthfully, then
buyer i is essentially forced to submit a bidding function as if his signal was the
value siA satisfying (5.17). The allocation and payment components of this auction
are equivalent to the allocation and payment components of auction 2, therefore if
every buyer j 6= i bids truthfully, then this auction is equivalent to auction 2, so
buyer i’s best response is to bid truthfully. Therefore truthful bidding is a Nash
Equilibrium and this auction is efficient.
Let’s prove this result also in case n = 2, although this case was proven in [6]
under more general conditions.
Since there is only one good, in case buyer 1 wins, he or she makes a payment
of v∗2 , where v
∗
2 = b2(v
∗
2).
Assume buyer 2 bids truthfully. Then we have
v1(s1A, s2A) ≥ v
∗
2 ⇐⇒ v1(s1A, s2A)− v
∗
2 ≥
1
c1
· (v1(s1A, s2A)− v
∗
2)
⇐⇒ v1(s1A, s2A)− v
∗
2 ≥ b2(v1(s1A, s2A))− b2(v
∗
2)
⇐⇒ v1(s1A, s2A) ≥ v2(s1A, s2A).
Therefore buyer 1 receives utility from winning the good if and only if his actual
valuation for the good is greater than buyer 2’s, so indeed truthful bidding is a best
response, and so truthfull bidding represents a Nash Equilibrium .
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6. Conclusion
In this paper we have provided efficient auction mechanisms in the case of linear,
separable valuation functions, under the assumption of scarcity ( as least as many
buyers than goods) and under the assumption that no buyer gains from having
more than one good. We also showed that except for linearity and separability, the
other assumptions are necessary for an efficient mechanism to exist. It would be
very interesting to try to extend the mechanisms in this paper in the case where
valuations are nonlinear and also in the case of more goods than buyers, even though
the latter is not usually true in practice.
I am very grateful to Professor Barry Mazur for very useful comments and
to Professor Eric Maskin for all his patience and guidance throughout this entire
process.
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